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ABSTRACT
Recommender systems have emerged as a new weapon to
help online firms to realize many of their strategic goals (e.g.,
to improve sales, revenue, customer experience etc.). How-
ever, many existing techniques commonly approach these
goals by seeking to recover preference (e.g., estimating rat-
ings) in a matrix completion framework. This paper aims to
bridge this significant gap between the clearly-defined strate-
gic objectives and the not-so-well-justified proxy.
We show it is advantageous to think of a recommender
system as an analogy to a monopoly economic market with
the system as the sole seller, users as the buyers and items as
the goods. This new perspective motivates a game-theoretic
formulation for recommendation that enables us to identify
the optimal recommendation policy by explicit optimizing
certain strategic goals. In this paper, we revisit and ex-
tend our prior work, the Collaborative-Competitive Filtering
preference model [32], towards a game-theoretic framework.
The proposed framework consists of two components. First,
a conditional preference model that characterizes how a user
would respond to a recommendation action; Second, know-
ing in advance how the user would respond, how a recom-
mender system should act (i.e., recommend) strategically
to maximize its goals. We show how objectives such as
click-through rate, sales revenue and consumption diversity
can be optimized explicitly in this framework. Experiments
are conducted on a commercial recommender system and
demonstrate promising results.
Categories and Subject Descriptors
H.5.3 [Information Systems]: Web-based Interaction;
H.3.3 [Information Search and Retrieval]: Information fil-
tering
General Terms
Algorithms, Performance
Keywords: Recommendation optimization, Collaborative
games, Econometric model, Expected utility theory
1. INTRODUCTION
Recommender systems have become a core component for
today’s online businesses. With the abilities of connecting
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merchant supply (i.e., items of various types such as retailing
products, movies, articles, ads, experts, etc.) to market de-
mands (i.e., potentially interested consumers), recommender
systems are helping online firms (e.g. Amazon, Netflix, Ya-
hoo!) to realize many of their hard-to-attain business goals
(e.g., to boost sales, improve revenue, enhance customer ex-
periences) [5, 6, 9, 30]. Compared to an offline market,
online recommender system has the unbeatable convenience
in control, intervention, monitoring and measurement of the
market, and consequently the appealing opportunity to ad-
just its operational actions (i.e., recommendation policy) to
optimize certain strategic objectives. Surprisingly, despite
the fact that many of these goals are clearly defined, they
are not optimized in today’s recommender systems in a well-
justified way. Instead, research on recommendation has been
focused almost exclusively on learning preference (e.g., esti-
mating a user’s rating to a movie) in a matrix completion
formulation [27, 22, 15, 8, 31]. It is rather unclear how
preference learning, as a proxy, approximates these goals, or
how a strategic intervention should be designed to achieve
certain goals.
In this paper, we seek to bridge this significant gap. We
show it is advantageous to look at the user-system interac-
tions and think of a recommender system as an analogy to
a monopoly economic market (i.e., system as the sole seller,
users as buyers and items as goods)1, rather than user-item
interactions as in the conventional matrix completion for-
mulation. This new perspective motivates a novel game-
theoretic formulation, upon which recommendation policy
can be optimized strategically with respect to business ob-
jectives such as click-through rate, sales revenue and con-
sumption diversity.
1.1 User-System Interactions
Recommender systems are commonly designed by analyz-
ing the dyadic user-item interactions as can be recorded by
a matrix, for example, users assigning ratings to movies.
Research has thus been focused exclusively on estimating
preference or equivalently completing the matrix of “who-
like-what” [4, 27, 22, 31, 2, 1, 15, 8]. This matrix-completion
formulation of recommendation has been extensively inves-
tigated and become especially popular thanks to the Netflix
Prize Competition. Nonetheless, as we show in this paper,
the formulation of recommendation as user-item interaction
or matrix completion is inherently flawed — recommenda-
tion is not solely about what you know (i.e., knowledge about
1Hereafter, we will use interchangeably “system” and
“seller”, “user” and “buyer”, “item” and “good”.
the user), but more importantly about how you act (i.e., how
to recommend items to serve the user or persuade the user
to consume). Instead, it is advantageous to think of rec-
ommendation as an interaction between the system and the
users and formulate it as an interdependent decision-making
process (aka games) [16].
In a typical interaction, the system acts by providing a set
of personalized recommendations, and user reacts by mak-
ing choices, i.e., by choosing to consume some of the recom-
mended items (e.g., click a link, rent a movie, view a News
article, purchase a product). This process in many aspects
resembles what happens in a monopoly market where the
recommender system, as the sole seller, has absolute market
power to manipulate the market, yet the utility it receives
depends on the reaction of the buyers (i.e., users), e.g., the
success of an advertising system is directly related to how
users react (i.e., whether they click the ads or not). Clearly,
the action of the seller and the reaction of the buyer are in-
terdependent – the two players (i.e., seller and buyer) each
has its own objective (i.e., utility) to achieve, yet how and
to what extend they can achieve their own objectives de-
pends also on the decision of the other player. Conventional
matrix completion formulation for recommendation is inher-
ently flawed as it is incapable to capture such interdependent
decision making interactions. As a results, although many
business objectives in e-commerce are clearly defined, how a
recommender can be designed to optimize these goals hasn’t
yet been explored.
1.2 Recommendation as Collaborative Games
In this paper, we present a game-theoretic formulation
for recommendation, where the user-system interactions are
modeled as a collection of coupled games with each game
played between the seller and one buyer (i.e., between the
system and one user). For the sake of statistical inference,
it is nonetheless important not to model these games as mu-
tually independent. We therefore bring forward the notion
of “collaborative games” that similar games are expected to
yield similar outcomes, which enables us to pool the sparse
data across games to obtain reliable statistical estimation.
We extend our prior work on “Collaborative-Competitive
Filtering”(CCF) preference model [32] towards a game-theoretic
framework. The framework consists of two components: (1)
a conditional model pu(R|A) that characterizes the reaction
R of a buyer u in the context of any given action A of the
seller; this model enables us to predict in advance what the
outcome of a game would be (e.g., how the buyer would
respond); and (2) given pu(R|A) for every buyer u, a for-
mulation for optimizing the seller’s action policy A w.r.t. a
predefined payoff (e.g., a strategic goal).
To effectively model pu(R|A), we revisit and extend the
CCF preference model [32] that integrates latent factor mod-
els in collaborative filtering with choice models in economet-
rics. By using latent factor based utility parametrization,
the model encodes the “collaboration effects” among games
[7, 23] to advocate the notion of “collaborative games”. As
the policy spaces are prohibitively large yet the observations
are extremely sparse, this formulation is essential for reli-
able statistical inference because it enables the sparse data
to be pooled across games. It also remarkably reduces the
parametric complexity of pu(R|A) significantly from a pro-
hibitive high-order polynomial scale down to a linear scale.
The knowledge about users’ reaction behavior, as charac-
terized by pu(R|A), enables us to predict“future”(i.e., user’s
reaction) with uncertainty and further to optimize the ac-
tion (i.e., the recommendation policy) of the recommender
system strategically [16]. For any input action A, the possi-
ble outcomes of the games occur with probabilities defined
upon pu(R|A). Given a payoff (i.e., a function of the out-
come) that is von Neumann-Morgenstern rational, the ex-
pected utility theory asserts that the best action is the one
that maximizes the expected payoff [25]. We show how busi-
ness objectives such as click-trough rate, sales revenue and
consumption diversity can be formulated explicitly as ex-
pected utilities and used in turn to optimize a recommender
system’s action policy.
We also show that the CCF model is sequentially ratio-
nal and thus approximates the perfect Nash equilibrium [16].
Experiments on a real-world commercial system demonstrate
that the proposed CCF model not only outperforms CF
models in both offline and online tests but is also highly
effective in achieving satisfactory strategic goals.
Outline: The rest of the paper is structured as follows.
We first briefly review the current matrix completion for-
mulation and collaborative filtering in Section 2. We then
present our new game-theoretic formulation in Section 3 and
the CCF model in Section 4. Experiments are presented in
Section 5, followed by summary and conclusion in Section 6.
2. USER-ITEM INTERACTIONS AND
COLLABORATIVE FILTERING
Many existing approaches generally think of recommen-
dation as user-item interactions and therefore aim to re-
cover/estimate the preference of each individual user to the
items. Given a set of N users
u ∈ U := {1, 2, . . . , N}
and a set of M items
i ∈ I := {1, 2, . . . ,M},
this is naturally formulated as a matrix completion prob-
lem, where we are given observations of dyadic responses
{(u, i, yui)} with each yui being an observed response in-
dicating user’s preference (e.g. user’s rating to an item, or
indication of whether user u likes item i), the goal is to
complete the whole mapping:
(u, i)→ yui where u ∈ U , i ∈ I
which constitutes a large matrix Y ∈ Y |U|×|I|. Assume each
item can be consumed multiple times, recommendations are
usually done by a simple preference-based ranking according
to Y , (i.e., recommending the items with highest yui scores
to user u). This formulation include both of the two major
categories of approaches to recommendation, i.e., content-
based filtering [4, 8] and collaborative filtering [27, 22, 1,
15], among which we briefly review the latter.
It is worth noting that the observed responses are often
extremely sparse in realistic systems, i.e., while we might
have millions of users and items, only a tiny proportion (con-
siderably less than 1%) of the entries of the matrix Y are
observable. This “data sparseness” issue has been widely
recognized as one of the key challenges of recommender sys-
tem [22, 1, 15]. To this end, collaborative filtering (CF) ex-
plores the notion of “collaboration effects”, i.e., similar users
have similar preferences to similar items. By encoding col-
laboration, CF pools the sparse observations in such a way
that for predicting yˆ(u, i) it also borrows observations from
other (similar) users/items. Generally speaking, existing CF
methods fall into either of the following two categories.
Neighborhood models. A popular class of approaches to
CF is based on propagating the observations of responses
among items or users that are considered as neighbors. The
model first defines a similarity measure between items /
users. Then, an unseen response between user u and item i
is approximated based on the responses of neighboring users
or items [27, 22], for example, by simply averaging the neigh-
boring responses with similarities as weights.
Latent factor models. This class of methods learns pre-
dictive latent factors to estimate the missing dyadic responses.
The basic idea is to associate latent factors2, φu ∈ R
k for
each user u and ψi ∈ R
k for each item i, and assume a
multiplicative model for the dyadic response,
p(yui|u, i) = p(yui|φ
⊤
u ψi; Θ),
where Θ denotes the set of hyper-parameters. This way the
factors could explain past responses and in turn make pre-
diction for future ones. This model implicitly encodes the
Aldous-Hoover theorem [13] for exchangeable matrices – yui
are independent of each other given φu and ψi. In essence, it
amounts to a low-rank approximation of the matrix Y that
naturally embeds both users and items into a vector space
in which the inner-products directly reflect the semantic re-
latedness.
To design a concrete model [2, 1, 15, 24, 28], one needs to
specify a distribution for the dependence. Afterwards, the
model boils down to an optimization problem. For example
two commonly-used formulations are:
- ℓ2 regression The most popular learning formulation is
to minimize the ℓ2 loss within an empirical risk mini-
mization framework [15]:
min
φ,ψ
∑
(u,i)∈O
(yui − φ
⊤
u ψi)
2 + λU
∑
u∈U
||φu||
2 + λI
∑
i∈I
||ψi||
2,
where O denotes the set of (u, i) dyads for which the
responses yui are observed, λU and λI are regulariza-
tion weights.
- Logistic Another popular formulation [24, 1] is to use
logistic regression by optimizing the cross-entropy:
min
φ,ψ
∑
(u,i)∈O
log
[
1 + exp(−φ⊤u ψi)
]
+ λU
∑
u∈U
||φu||
2 + λI
∑
i∈I
||ψi||
2
3. USER-SYSTEM INTERACTION AS
COLLABORATIVE GAMES
Based on the perspective of user-item interactions, the
matrix completion formulation for recommendation has led
to numerous algorithms which excel at a number of data sets,
including the prize-winning work of [15] and many other
successful collaborative filtering algorithms [27, 22, 26, 1,
15, 31, 17]. However, as we discussed, this formulation is
inherently flawed; instead, it is advantageous to model the
user-system interactions so as to capture the interdependent
2We assume each latent factor φ contains a constant compo-
nent so as to absorb user/item-specific offset into the latent
factor φ and ψ.
User System Action User Reaction
u1 [i1, i2, i3, i5] i2
u2 [i2, i3, i4, i5] ∅
u3 [i1, i3, i5, i6] i5
u4 [i2, i3, i4, i6] i3
u5 [i1, i3, i4, i5] i4
u6 [i1, i4, i5, i6] i6
Table 1: An example trace of user-system interac-
tions in recommendation.
decision-making process between the system and the users.
This motivates a novel game-theoretic formulation for rec-
ommendation and opens up a promising direction that en-
able us to optimize recommendation policy strategically in
respect of important business objectives, which cannot be
achieved otherwise with the conventional matrix completion
formulation.
Consider a typical scenario of user-system interaction in a
recommender system: we haveN users u ∈ U := {1, 2, . . . , N}
andM items i ∈ I := {1, 2, . . . ,M}; when a user u visits the
site, the system recommends a set of items A = {i1, . . . , il}
and u in turn chooses a (possibly empty) subset R ⊆ A for
consumption (e.g. buys some of the recommended products).
From now on, we refer to A as action, and R as reaction.
For simplicity, we assume each action is fixed-size with a
given length, |A| = l, and that each reaction is either empty
or contains exactly one choice, |R| = 1 or 0. Therefore, we
have A ∈ A = Il and R ∈ R ⊂ I˜ = I ∪ {∅}. Table 1 shows
an example trace of such interactions.
The behavior of the recommender system and that of the
users are interdependent. On the one hand, since people
make different decisions when facing different contexts, a
user’s decision R depends crucially on the action of the sys-
tem, A, (i.e., what was provided to him). For instance, an
item i would not have been chosen by u if it were not pre-
sented to him at the first place; likewise, user u could choose
another item if the contextA changes such that a better item
were recommended to him. On the other hand, how a rec-
ommender system acts also depend on user’s behavior (i.e.,
response), because the success of recommendation (i.e., in
terms of click-through, revenue, etc.) is defined directly on
how users react to it (e.g., purchase a product, click an ad,
rent a movie). It is therefore nature to formulate recom-
mendation based on game theory, as analogy to a monopoly
market where the recommender as the sole seller, a user as
a buyer and the items as the goods.
Formally, the user-system interactions in a recommender
system can be formulated as a set of N non-cooperative
games G = {Gn = (Pn,Zn, Un), n = 1, 2, . . . , N}. For each
gameGn, the player set Pn = {S, un} consists of two players,
i.e., the system (i.e., seller) S and a user (i.e., buyer) un;
the policy space Zn = A × R ⊂ I
l × I˜ is the set of all
possible action-reaction pairs Zn = (An, Rn), where Z is
called an outcome and Z the outcome space; and the utility
(i.e., payoff) function Un = {US(Zn), Uu(Zn)} consists of
the system’s payoff US and the user’s payoff Uu. At an
interaction t, a user ut visits the system and the game Gut
is played with outcome Zt = (At, Rt) and utility output
U(At, Rt). Since the users’ behavior is not in our control,
our goal in designing a recommender system is to generate
a system action (recommendations) At˜ for an incoming visit
t˜ of user ut˜ so as to maximize the system’s payoff Us(Zt˜).
It is important to emphasize that the games in G should
not be modeled as independent games. Particularly, since
the outcome space can be very large, yet observations are
typically sparse, it is practically important to still be able
to leverage the collaboration effect such that similar games
are expected to yield similar outcomes. This way it enables
us to pool the sparse evidences across different but similar
games and in turn obtain reliable statistical inference. For
this reason, we term the formulation “collaborative games”
with a slight abuse of terminology.
This game-theoretic formulation provides a novel perspec-
tive for recommendation. Particularly, since the strategies
of the buyer and the seller are interdependent, to optimize
the seller’s action, we have to (1) for each candidate action
A, predict the buyer’s reaction R in advance; and then (2)
find the best action A by maximizing the achievable payoff
Us(A,R).
4. COLLABORATIVE COMPETITIVE
FILTERING
Our recent work [32] established the first principled model
for learning preference from user-system interactions in rec-
ommendation system. Unlike conventional preference learn-
ing models which are trained on the who-like-what matrix,
our CCF preference model is trained on user-system interac-
tions where the system action A is used as a context in which
a user’s reaction (e.g., “like”) R is made; in other word, CCF
model doesn’t only capture who-like-what, but it also con-
siders what are the options available to the user when the
“like” decision is made. As demonstrated in our experiments
[32] and many other successful applications (e.g., online test
on Yahoo! and Netflix), the CCF preference model signifi-
cantly improves recommendation performance on a variety
of data sets. However, like many existing recommendation
algorithms, our prior CCF model is still within the conven-
tional matrix completion framework. To be precise, all these
models only care about, and are only capable to model, the
behavior of the user (i.e., what a user likes). These tech-
niques are lacking as they largely ignore the interdependent
or game-theoretic nature of the user-system interactions in
recommendation, and consequently, none of them is able to
optimize the recommendation policy explicitly in respect of
a prescribed objective (although many strategic objectives
for a recommender system are clearly defined).
In this paper, we extend our prior work and present a
game-theoretic framework for recommendation. We would
like to keep the name “Collaborative-Competitive Filtering”
or CCF since the preference model we established in our
prior work is revised and used as one essential component of
this framework. The CCF framework consists of two compo-
nents: (1) a model Pu(R|A) that predicts in advance (with
uncertainty) a buyer’s reaction R to a given action A; and
(2) a formulation for finding the best action strategy (i.e.,
recommendation policy) for the seller.
4.1 Conditional User Reaction Modeling
The first part of the framework is to predict a buyer’s
choice R in the context of any given action A of the seller’s.
In a decision environment with imperfect information, this
means to quantify the conditional distribution pu(R|A). The
full parametrized version of this distribution requiresO(NM l+1)
free parameters, statistical estimation of which is practically
prohibitive since the observations are typically available only
at a scale far less than O(NM) (e.g., in matrix comple-
tion, usually less than 1% entries are observed). In this sec-
tion, we revisit and extend our CCF preference model [32]
by presenting a conditional reaction model with complexity
O(N +M).
4.1.1 Behavioral Axioms of Choice Process
We first present an axiomatic view of the choice process.
We assume a good (i.e., item) i has a potential utility rui to
a buyer u. Moreover, we assume a buyer u is a rational de-
cision maker: he knows that his choice of a good i will be at
the expense of other available alternatives i′ ∈ A, therefore
he compares among all the alternatives before making his
choice. In other words, for each decision, u considers both
revenue and opportunity cost, and decides which good to buy
based on the potential profit of each good in A. Specifically,
the opportunity cost cui is the potential loss of u from buy-
ing a good i that excludes him to buy other alternatives:
cui = max{rui′ : i
′ ∈ A \ i}; the profit πui = rui − cui is
the net gain of an decision. Based on the rational decision
theory [18], we have the following axiom about the buyer’s
choice reaction.
Axiom 1 [Local optimality of choice]: A rational deci-
sion is a decision maximizing the profit: i∗ = argmaxi∈A πui.
This axiom implies a local competitive effect : the buyer
u turns to chooses the good that is locally the best in the
context of the available alternatives in At. Unfortunately,
the axiom restricts the utility function only up to an arbi-
trary order-preserving transformation (e.g. a monotonically
increasing function), and hence cannot yield a unique solu-
tion [19]. Another issue is that it is deterministic, less useful
since we don’t have perfect information about how users re-
act. To this end, we draw an stochastic counterpart of this
axiom from the random utility theory [18, 21]:
Axiom 2 [Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives]:
For any given context set A, the relative odds of a user u’s
selecting an item i ∈ A over another item j ∈ A should
be independent of the presence or absence of any irrelevant
items, i.e.,
pu(i|{i, j})
pu(j|{i, j})
=
pu(i|A)
pu(j|A)
(1)
Note that this axiom brings the parametric complexity of
pu(R|A) significantly down from O(NM
l+1) to O(NM2).
4.1.2 User Utility Parametrization
In the spirit of the random utility theory [18, 21], we
decompose the buyer’s utility function into two parts, i.e.,
Uu(i) = rui + eui, where: (1) rui is a deterministic compo-
nent characterizing the intrinsic interest of the buyer u to
the good i; (2) the second part eui is a stochastic unobserved
error term reflecting the uncertainty, richness and complex-
ity of the choice process. Under very mild conditions, it
has been shown that the error terms eui are independently
and identically distributed with the Weibull (extreme point)
distribution [11]:
P (eui 6 ǫ) = e
−e−ǫ . (2)
Furthermore, to encode the collaborative effect such that the
observed evidences could be pooled across similar games, we
parametrize the deterministic utilities, rui, with the multi-
plicative latent factor model [15, 1]:
rui = φ
⊤
uψi (3)
where φu ∈ R
k and ψi ∈ R
k are low-rank latent profiles for
user u and item i respectively, just as in the collaborative
filtering models we described in Section 2.
4.1.3 The Multinomial Logit Factor Model
The behavioral axiom and the low-rank parametrization
together lead to the following theorem.
Theorem 1: Suppose the utility function Uu(i) = rui +
ǫui, where ǫ are i.i.d. Weibull variables, then the distribu-
tion of selecting one item that satisfies Axiom 2 is given by
pu(i|A) = e
rui/
∑
j∈A e
ruj for any i ∈ A.
Proof. c.f. [21] . ✷
The above model is well-known as the multinomial logit
model, which has been extensively used for modeling con-
ventional offline consumer choice behavior (e.g., choose of
occupation, brand, housing) in econometrics [21, 19], socio-
metrics [18] and marketing science [10, 12]. We adapt it for
modeling online game-theoretic interactions in recommender
systems. In contrast to the traditional choice models, where
the deterministic part of the utility rui is a linear mapping
w⊤xui of observed features xui (i.e., measured user and item
features), here we employ the multiplicative latent factor
parametrization. The formulation proposed hereby seam-
lessly integrate two distinct methodologies — choice models
in econometrics and factorization models in collaborative fil-
tering. This integration is significant because it enables us
to model the seller-buyer games collaboratively, rather than
independently as in conventional choice models. That is, it
enables us to pool data across games such that the inter-
actions engaging similar users, similar actions and similar
reactions are dealt with in a similar way.
Moreover, in conventional choice models, it is assumed
that in each interaction t, the buyer will take at least one
item i∗ ∈ At. This assumption is, however, not true in our
case since user’s visit to a recommender system does not
always yields a response. For example, users frequently visit
online e-commerce website without making any purchase, or
browse a news portal without clicking on any ad. Actually,
such nonresponded visits may account for a vast majority
of the traffics that an recommender system receives. More
interestingly, different users may have different propensities
for giving a response. It is important to reflect this in the
model as well. To this end, we add a scalar latent factor,
θu, for each user u to capture the response propensity of the
buyer u. At an interaction t, we assume buyer ut makes
an effective purchase only if he feels that the overall quality
of the offered goods At are good enough. In other words,
there is a certain reserve utility that needs to be exceeded
for a user to respond. In keeping with the multinomial logit
model and the latent factor parametrization, we have the
following model
pu(R = i|A) =
exp(φ⊤uψi)
exp(θu) +
∑
j∈A exp(φ
⊤
u ψj)
, ∀ i ∈ A; (4)
pu(R = ∅|A) =
exp(θu)
exp(θu) +
∑
j∈A exp(φ
⊤
u ψj)
otherwise (5)
which we refer to as multinomial logit factor or MLF model.
Note that this new formulation reduces the parametric com-
plexity of pu(R|A) significantly to linear scale, i.e., O(k(N+
M)+N) ≈ O(N +M), where k is the dimensionality of the
latent factor φ ∈ Rk and ψ ∈ Rk, which is generally a small
number (usually up to a few hundreds).
4.1.4 Position Bias
An important factor that was overlooked by the MLF
model yet is important in practice is the position bias. In
particular, the choice of a buyer depends not only on the
utilities of the available alternatives but also on how they
are placed (i.e., the positions), e.g., users usually pay atten-
tions only to a few top-ranked goods and totally disregard
the others. Such position bias is evident in many online de-
cision making scenarios, e.g., Web search, recommendation,
advertising. We extend the MLF model by adding a set of
position-specific latent factors {βp ∈ R
k, p = 1, . . . , l} via:
pu(R = i|A) =
exp(〈φu, ψi, βp(i)〉)
exp(θu) +
∑
j∈A exp(〈φu, ψj , βp(j)〉)
, (6)
where p(i) denotes the position of item i, 〈φ, ψ, β〉 = 1⊤(φ ◦
ψ ◦ β) =
∑k
i=1 φ[i]ψ[i]β[i] is a three-way inner product, ◦
denotes Hadamard (aka element-wise) product.
4.1.5 Conditional Maximum Likelihood Estimation
Given a collection of training interactions {(ut, At, Rt)},
the latent factors, φ and ψ, can be estimated using penalized
conditional maximum likelihood estimation via
min
φ,ψ,θ,β
:
∑
t
{log[eθut +
∑
j∈At
e〈φutψjβpj 〉]− (1− δ∅,t)〈φutψi∗βpi∗ 〉
− δ∅,tθut}+ λU
∑
u∈U
||φu||
2 + λI
∑
i∈I
||ψi||
2 + λP
l∑
p=1
||βp||
2.
where δ∅,t = 1 if Rt = ∅, or 0 otherwise.
4.1.6 Distributed Stochastic Optimization
Due to the use of bilinear multiplications, although the
conditional likelihood is convex w.r.t. rui as each of the
objective terms is strongly concave, it is nontheless non-
convex w.r.t. the latent factors φ and ψ. Moreover since
the interactions evolve over time, it is desirable to have al-
gorithms that are sufficiently efficient and preferably capa-
ble to update dynamically so as to reflect upcoming data
streams, therefore excluding offline learning algorithms such
as classical SVD-based factorization algorithms [15] or spec-
tral eigenvalue decomposition methods [17]. Here, we use a
distributed stochastic gradient variant based on the Hadoop
MapReduce framework. The infrastructure is analogous to
what was proposed in [33]. The basic module is a stochastic
gradient descent algorithm, which loops over all the observa-
tions and updates the parameters by moving in the direction
defined by negative gradient. For example, for a given re-
sponded session (u,A, i∗), we can carry out the following to
update the latent factors on each machine separately:
• For u do:
φu ← φu − η
[∑
i∈A
l′(u, i)× ψi ◦ βpi + λUφu
]
.
• For each i ∈ A do:
ψi ← ψi − η
[
l′(u, i)× φu ◦ βpi + λIψi
]
.
• For each p ∈ {1, . . . , l} do:
βp ← βp − η
[
l′(u, ip)× ψip ◦ φu + λPβp
]
.
where η is the learning rate3. The gradient is given by:
l′(u, i) =
exp(〈φuψiβpi〉)
exp(θu) +
∑
j∈A exp(〈φuψjβpj 〉)
− δi,i∗ . (7)
4.2 Strategic System Action Optimization
The distribution pu(R|A) characterizes (in probability)
how a buyer would react to a given action. Knowing this
enables us to optimize the seller’s action strategy (i.e., rec-
ommendation policy) by maximizing its utility (payoff) US
[16]. In this section, we show that this can be formulated
based on von Neumann-Morgenstern’s expected utility the-
ory. We then specify the formulation in terms of three exam-
ple payoff objectives, i.e., click-through rate, sales revenue
and consumption diversity.
4.2.1 Expected Utility Maximization
Because of the uncertainty/risk inherent in the game, it is
nature to formulate action optimization as decision making
under uncertainty. Consider a given game Gu between the
seller S and a specific buyer u, the action space is the set
of all possible combinations of l goods, A = IL. An action
A ∈ A yields an outcome Z = (A,R) ∈ Z = A × R with
probability distribution p(Z) (aka lottery), where the reac-
tion space R = A ∪ {∅}. Because our knowledge about the
environment is imperfect, we would rather adopt a proba-
bilistic action strategy such that actions for Gu are sampled
according to a distribution pu(A) (defined over the action
space A , any A ∈ A is taken with probability pu(A)), then
we have pu(Z) = pu(A)pu(R|A), where we specify the de-
pendence on the user with a subscript to emphasize the fact
that the action is customized for each user.
A utility function US(Z) is a mapping US : Z → R, which
defines a preference relation < over the outcome space Z
such that Z < Z′ if and only if US(Z) > US(Z
′). Without
loss of generality, we assume < is von Neumann-Morgenstern
rational, i.e., it satisfies the four axioms: completeness, tran-
sitivity, independence and continuity. The von Neumann-
Morgenstern (vNM) theorem defines the best outcome of a
decision in an environment under uncertainty as follows[25].
Theorem 2 [Expected Utility]: Suppose < is a pref-
erence defined by an utility function US that satisfies the 4
axioms, for any two distributions (lotteries) p(Z) and q(Z),
we have: p < q if and only if Ep(US) > Eq(US).
Proof. c.f. [25]. ✷
Based on the vNM theorem, the optimal action strategy
pu(A), given pu(R|A), can be achieved by the following lin-
ear optimization:
max
pu(A)
∑
A∈A
pu(A)
∑
R∈R
pu(R|A)US(A,R) (8)
s.t. :
∑
A∈A
pu(A) = 1, and pu(A) > 0.
3We carry out an annealing procedure to discount η by a
constant factor after each iteration, as suggested by [14].
A simplex solution for the above is given simply by:
pu(A) = δA,A∗u where A
∗
u = argmax
A
∑
R∈R
pu(R|A)US(A,R).
In practice, it is usually favorable, (e.g., for risk-robustness
reasons) to choose a less sparse distribution (i.e., a portfolio
[20]) rather than the singular distribution as defined by a
simplex solution, the discussion of which is, however, beyond
the scope of this work.
4.2.2 Action Strategy Parametrization
Although the simplex solution looks simple, exhaustive
search throughout the outcome space is still something prac-
tically prohibitive as there are O(NM l+1) extreme points.
To this end, we propose to parameterize the action distri-
bution in terms of a small set of parameters Θ, e.g., to as-
sume action A is sampled from a parametric distribution
pu(A;Θ). In this way, we can search A efficiently by opti-
mizing Θ instead. As a preliminary study, here we devise a
simple parametrization by randomizing a utility-based rank-
ing scheme with a scalar parameter α. Particularly, for any
given user u, assume the top-ranked l items (i.e., items with
highest payoffs) are denoted {i∗1 , . . . , i
∗
l }, we generate the
action A as follows:
• A = ∅.
• For j from 1 to l do:
- With probability (1− α) add i∗j to A
- With probability α add an random item to A
This way, action optimization in Eq(8) become a one-dimensional
optimization, to which the solution can be obtained effi-
ciently, e.g., via golden-section search.
A more flexible parametrization is to factorize p(A) se-
quentially p(A) = p(i1)p(i2|i1) . . . p(il|i1, i2, . . . , il−1), with
a few simplifications, we can search the action space by dy-
namic programming. We leave this for future research.
4.2.3 Strategic Payoff Specification
So far, our discussion of action optimization is in terms of
an abstract payoff function US . We now specify our formu-
lation with three concrete strategic objectives.
Payoff #1: Click-Through Rate (CTR). Click-through
rate or CTR is the ratio of responses (i.e., Rt 6= ∅) out of
all the interactions. CTR is the most important measure of
success for many real-world recommender systems because it
crucially determines so many important factors ranging from
traffic, revenue to user base. For example, it corresponds to
the advertisement click rate in Google, the movie rental rate
in Netflix, the order placement rate in Amazon, and the rate
of friend connection in Facebook Friend-Finder. CTR can
be formulated in the CCF framework as follows:
CTR = Eu[EA[pu(R 6= ∅|A)]] (9)
=
∑
u∈U
fu
∑
A∈A
pu(A)pu(R 6= ∅|A)
where fu is a measure of user loyalty (e.g., user u’s visit
frequency), pu(R 6= ∅|A) = 1−
exp(θu)
exp(θu)+
∑
i∈A exp(φ
⊤
u ψi)
.
Payoff #2: Sales Revenue (SR). Another important
measure of success is sales revenue or SR, which is the rev-
enue that a recommender system receives from the transac-
tions (interactions) with the users. SR is a weighted version
of CTR, i.e., each click is assigned a weight of importance.
Based on CCF, SR can be formulated via:
SR = Eu[EA[Ei∈A[cipu(R = i|A)]]] (10)
=
∑
u∈U
fu
∑
A∈A
pu(A)
∑
i∈A
cipu(R = i|A)
where ci denotes the price (weight) of an item i.
Payoff #3: Consumptions Diversity (CD). It is widely
believed that recommender systems are the key contributor
that turns the industry from what used to be a highly con-
centrated “blockbuster” 4 towards a highly diversified long-
tail (niche) market [5, 30]. Recent research shows that this
is, however, not entirely true — a recommender system, if
designed improperly, could reinforce consumption concen-
trations [9]. In order not to turn our society to a echo
chamber, it is important to encourage consumption diver-
sity (CD), i.e., to ensure the consumptions of the whole
population are not narrowly concentrated. Moreover, CD
is also important to online firms to help them gain profit
from long-tail market. CD can be formulated based on the
CCF framework in terms of expected choice entropy:
CD = Eu[EA[Hu(R|A)]] (11)
= −
∑
u∈U
fu
∑
A∈A
pu(A)
∑
i∈A
pu(R = i|A) log pu(R = i|A)
where Hu(R|A) =
∑
i∈A pu(R = i|A) log pu(R = i|A) is
the entropy of user u’s choice in the context of A. Note
that consumption diversity is an aggregate measure (i.e.,
the diversity of the consumptions of the whole population),
which is different from the traditional individual diversity
(i.e., the dissimilarity of items recommended to an individual
user).
4.3 Implications of CCF and Future Work
We finally remark that there are some interesting prop-
erties of the proposed CCF model. Firstly, since the games
in user-system interactions are finite, there exists an equilib-
rium point (i.e., a stable strategy). As a matter of fact, since
that the reaction to a given action is rational and that the
action given pu(R|A) is vNM-rational, it can be shown that
the CCF model approximates the perfect Nash equilibrium
[16]. From a practical point of view, it is, however, possi-
ble to optimize the recommender systems more aggressively
beyond the market equilibrium. Particularly, the analogy
of recommender system to a monopoly market provides a
number of important perspectives , e.g., the reflection of
price discrimination in recommender system — how recom-
mender system can exploit its market power to transfer the
consumer surplus [5]. Another interesting topic is to explore
the correlation and conflict of goods, and optimize action A
as a bundle based on portfolio theory [20, 3]. We would
rather leave these interesting discussions for future research.
5. EXPERIMENTS
We test the proposed CCF framework on a real-world
commercial recommender system. Because CCF is com-
prised of two components, it is necessary to test each of
them separately — otherwise, it would be difficult to tell if a
4The well-known 80-20 rule or the Pareto principle states
that, of the many goods available, consumptions are con-
centrated on a small subset of bestselling ones.
change of performance is due to one component or the other
or both. Our experiments therefore consist of two test-beds.
Firstly, we compare the proposed conditional reaction model
(i.e., the Multinomial logit factor model) in our CCF frame-
work (referred to as CCF II) with the plain CCF preference
model proposed in our prior work [32] (referred to as CCF
I5) as well as state-of-the art CF baselines in terms of their
abilities in preference estimation; to maintain a fair compari-
son, recommendations are done without action optimization
for CCF II, i.e., via simple utility-based ranking. This com-
parison gives us an idea on how effective our MLF model
for pu(R|A) is compared with state-of-the art preference
models. Furthermore, we compare the CCF framework (i.e.,
MLF + Action optimization) and the conventional recom-
mendation scheme (i.e., CF + utility-based ranking). This
comparison further demonstrates how the game-theoretic
formulation, particularly how action optimization, further
enhance the recommendation performance.
5.1 Data
We collected a large-scale set of user-system interaction
traces from a commercial News article recommender sys-
tem. In each interaction, the system offers four personalized
articles to the visiting user, and the user chooses one of them
by clicking to read that article. The recommendations are
dynamically changing over time even during the user’s visit.
The system regularly logs every click event of every user
visit. It also records the articles being presented to users
at a series of discrete time points. To obtain the action set
for each user-system interaction, we therefore trace back to
the closest recording time point right before the user-click,
and we use the articles presented at that time point as the
action set for the current session. We collected such interac-
tion traces from logged records of over one month. We use a
random subset containing 3.6 million users, 2500 items and
over 110 million interaction traces. Learning an effective
recommender on this data set is particularly challenging as
the article pool is dynamically refreshing, and each article
only has a lifetime of several hours — it only appears once
within a particular day, is then pulled out from the pool
afterward and never appears again.
5.2 CCF Without Action Optimization
We first evaluate CCF without action optimization (CCF
II) with comparison to the plain CCF preference model (i.e.,
CCF I) and the two CF models described in Section 2, where
recommendations are made by utility-based ranking. We
consider the following two evaluation settings, one offline
and the other online.
Offline evaluation We evaluate the learned recommender
models in terms of the top-k ranking performance on
a hold-out test subset. We use three standard infor-
mation retrieval measures as evaluation metrics, i.e.
average-precision at position n (AP@n), average-recall
at n (AR@n) and normalized-discounted-cumulative-
gain at n (nDCG@n), where n = 4, the default recom-
mendation size used in the news recommender system.
Online evaluation We further conduct an online test. In
particular. for each incoming interaction, we use the
5Note that the essential differences between CCF I and II
are merely: (1) CCF II models null reactions and response
propensities; (2) CCF II models position bias.
Table 2: Offline test: comparison of top-k ranking
performance.
Model AP@4 AR@4 nDCG@4
30% Training
CF-ℓ2 0.245 0.261 0.255
CF-Logistic 0.246 0.263 0.257
CCF I 0.262 0.278 0.274
CCF II 0.267 0.279 0.278
50% Training
CF-ℓ2 0.250 0.273 0.268
CF-Logistic 0.252 0.276 0.269
CCF I 0.266 0.285 0.278
CCF II 0.269 0.284 0.281
70% Training
CF-ℓ2 0.253 0.275 0.271
CF-Logistic 0.253 0.276 0.274
CCF I 0.267 0.287 0.280
CCF II 0.271 0.284 0.282
Table 3: Online test: comparison of conditional re-
action prediction accuracy.
Model 30%train 50%train 70%train
Random 0.250
CF-ℓ2 0.337 0.343 0.347
CF-Logistic 0.341 0.345 0.347
CCF I 0.377 0.385 0.391
CCF II 0.383 0.387 0.392
trained models to predict user choice reaction, i.e.,
which item among the four recommended ones will be
taken by the user. This prediction directly assesses the
accuracy of the MLF model in user reaction modeling.
Offline test results. In this setting, we train each model
on progressive proportions of 30%, 50% and 70% randomly-
sampled training data respectively, and evaluate each trained
model in terms of offline top-k ranking performance. The re-
sults are reported in Table 2. Since the data set is fairly large
the standard deviations of all values are considerably below
0.001. Consequently we omitted the latter from the results.
As can be seen from the table, the CCF II (i.e., MLF) model
dramatically outperform the two CF baselines in all of the
three evaluation metrics. Specifically, CCF II gains up to
9.0% improvement over the two CF models in terms of aver-
age precision; up to 6.9% in terms of average recall and up
to 8.9% in terms of nDCG. Moreover, by modeling position
bias and response propensity, CCF II also outperforms CCF
I in most (7 out of 9) of the comparisons. Note that even
compared to CCF I, the improvements achieved by CCF II
are also significant (e.g., for the system we worked on, any
improvement of the dashboard metrics especially nDCG or
CTR greater than 0.1% is a significant breakthrough). Also
note that the offline results obtained by CCF are quite sat-
isfactory. For example, the average precision is up to 0.271,
which means, out of the four recommended items, on av-
erage 1.1 are truly “relevant” (i.e. actually being clicked by
the user). This performance is quite promising especially
considering that most of the articles in the content pool are
transient and subject to dynamically updating.
Online test results. We further evaluate the online perfor-
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Figure 1: Top: Position bias in user choice reac-
tion; Bottom: Comparison of recommendation per-
formance before and after modeling position bias.
mance of each compared model by assessing their predictions
of user reaction. In particular, for each of the incoming re-
sponded visits (ut, At, i
∗
t ), we ask the question: “among all
the recommended items i ∈ At, which one will most likely
be clicked?”We use the trained model to rank the items in
A, and compare the top-ranked item with the actual choice
of the user (i.e. i∗t ). We evaluate the results in terms of
the prediction accuracy. The results are given in Table 3.
Because the size of each offer set in the current data set is
4, a random predictor yields 0.25. As can be seen from the
table, while both the two CF models and the two CCF mod-
els obtain significantly better predictions than the random
predictor, the two CCF models further dramatically outper-
form the two CF baselines, with CCF II performs consis-
tently the best. In particular, CCF II improves the reaction
prediction accuracy: compared with the least square CF by
13.7%, with the logistic CF by 12.7% and with CCF I by
1.6%. According to a t-test with significance level 0.01, all
the improvements are statistically significant.
Impact of position bias. We observe significant position
bias in the News recommender system. As shown in Fig-
ure 1(top), the left-most and right-most positions (i.e., posi-
tion 1 and 4) receive significantly higher click rate than the
two middle ones (i.e., position 2 and 3). In the bottom fig-
ure, we show the recommendation performance of the CCF
(i.e., MLF) model before and after incorporating bias fac-
tors (i.e., β in Eq(6)). We can see from this figure that the
performance improvements from CCF I to CCF II can be
attributed mostly to the position bias factor. Further exper-
iments confirm that the propensity factor only contributes
a marginal improvement in nDCG.
Impact of parameters. The performance of the MLF
model is affected by the parameter settings of the latent di-
mensionality, k, as well as the regularization weights, λI and
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Figure 2: Offline top-k ranking performance
(nDCG@4) as a function of latent dimensionality k
(top) and regularization weight λ (bottom).
λU . In Figure 2
6, we illustrate how the offline top-k rank-
ing performance changes as a function of these parameters,
where we use the same value for both λI and λU . Here we
only reported the results with nDCG@4 measure because
the results show similar tendency when other measures (in-
cluding the reaction accuracy) are used. As can be seen from
the Figure, the nDCG curves are typically in the inverted
U-shape with the optimal values achieved at the middle. In
particular, for the MLF model, the dimensionality around
50–100 and regularization weight around 0.0001 yield the
best performance, which is also the default parameter set-
ting we used in obtaining the results reported in the current
paper.
5.3 CCF With Action Optimization
We now move on to evaluate the entire CCF framework
(i.e., MLF + action optimization) in terms of its ability to
achieve the three strategic goals.
Evaluation metrics. We test a recommendation model by
applying it on top of the algorithm in production and com-
paring the results with the production baseline. To assess
performance, we report the relative surplus. In particular,
let m denote one of the three measures (i.e., click-through
rate, sales revenue and consumption diversity), a relative
surplus score is defined by:
relative surplus =
m(model)−m(production)
m(production)
Evaluation protocol. To illustrate how effective action
optimization could be, we compare CCF with action op-
timization (CCF+AO), to CCF without action optimiza-
tion (CCF-AO) as well as the conventional recommenda-
tion scheme (collaborative filtering with utility-based ranking
or CF+RK). For each model, we simulate its relative surplus
6Due to heavy computational consumptions, these results
are obtained on a relatively small subset of data.
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Figure 3: Performance in achieving strategic objec-
tives: relative surplus compared to the production
baseline in terms of CTR, SR and CD.
score by applying the model to the production output. In
particular, we take the top 50K users who visit our website
most frequently as test probes and trace them for one month.
For each of these user u and each of the dates d, we maintain
a positive set Pu,d and a negative set Nu,d by including all
the articles that user u reads on date d into Pu,d and any
other items in the content pool of date d into Nu,d. We as-
sume user u turns to take items only from Pu,d and ignores
those in Nu,d on date d. Specifically, the reaction of user u
on date d to any action A is assumed as follows: for any item
i ∈ A, if A∩Pu,d 6= ∅ and i ∈ A∩Pu,d, u takes i with prob-
ability 1/|A ∩Nu,d| or otherwise ignores it; a nonresponded
session occurs when Pu,d = ∅. To compute sales revenue, we
randomly assign to each item a positive number as “price”,
which is predefined and never changed throughout the eval-
uation. Moreover, maximizing consumption diversity alone
leads to meaningless random recommendations; to this end,
we impose a hard constraint to ensure that the decreases in
CTR is no more than 0.5%.
Results and analysis. The aggregate results on the 50K
probe users are depicted in Figure 3. Applying a traditional
recommendation scheme (CF + preference based ranking)
on top of the production baseline only yields marginal im-
provements in CTR and SR. In contrast, CCF gains up to
4.5% and 3.9% surplus in CTR and SR respectively; and
action optimization further significantly enhance these num-
bers. Interestingly, in terms of consumption diversity, our
experiment confirms the findings of [9]. For example, apply-
ing CF and CCF-AO directly without consideration of CD
inevitably leads to consumption concentration, as shown by
the negative surplus scores in Figure 3. In contrast, CCF
+ AO is the only one among the three models that yields
positive surplus in CD. In particular, with less than 0.5%
reduction of CTR, it gains up to 3.2% improvement of di-
versity. These observations are somewhat surprising consid-
ering that the preliminary action parametrization we used
in the experiment is a bit overly-simplistic — it merely con-
tains one single parameter α for simple randomization (c.f.
Section 4.2.2). In future work, we plan to explore more flex-
ible forms of action parametrization such as the sequential
factorization model mentioned in 4.2.2; we expect to have
even more promising results.
6. SUMMARY
We presented a novel game-theoretic framework for rec-
ommendation by viewing the user-system interactions at rec-
ommender system as buyer-seller interactions in a monopoly
economic market. Since the decisions of the user and the
buyer are interdependent, this new perspective motivates us
to optimize the action strategy of the system by first pre-
dicting users’ reaction and then adapting its action to max-
imize the expected payoff. The extended CCF framework
consists two essential components: (1) a model for pu(R|A)
that integrates choice models in econometrics and latent fac-
tor model in collaborative filtering to encode the notion of
collaborative games; and (2) a formulation for optimizing
system action A in terms of expected strategic payoffs such
as click-through rate, sales revenue and consumption diver-
sity. Experiments on a real-world commercial recommender
system have demonstrated the effectiveness and appealing
promise of the proposed framework.
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